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The Debate Over Passive DNS Data
If there was a scholar to look back upon the history of the world wide web in 50 years’ time, they had probably have the ability to build an evolutionary timeline based upon risks and countermeasures comparatively readily.
Now, everyone can go out as well as choose from a near limitless variety of data feeds that run the gamut from phishing URL ‘s stations and quick and malware hashes -flux IPs.
Whether you need live feeds, bulk data, historic data, or only API’s it is possible to hook in and ad hoc query, more than one organization or individual is apparently offering it someplace as a premium service or on the Internet; for free.
In many manners security feeds are like water. Person or organization’re accessible virtually everywhere if you take time to search; nevertheless their utility, volume, cleanliness, and ease of obtaining, may change greatly. Thus their value depends upon the acquirers needs as well as the source. Pure spring water could be come bottled, or free from the neighborhood stream and be more costly than a java at Starbucks.
At this juncture in history, the security sector remains attempting to determine the best way to actually make the most of the growing variety of data feeds. Sellers and businesses like to throw across the term “intelligence feeds” and “risk analytics” as a way of identifying their data feeds from opponents as soon as they’ve processed multiple lists and information sources to (basically) remove material — just like filtering water and diminishing the mineral count — raising the cost and “worth”.
From my standpoint, in advancing towards actionable intelligence, the most significant additive feed is not Active DNS data (pDNS).
For all those readers unfamiliar with pDNS, it’s a database including data associated with successful DNS resolutions — usually picked from only below the caching or recursive DNS server.
PDNS, by my perspective, is invaluable, but its contributions towards actionable intelligence could be similar to turning water into wine when used along with other data feeds.
For instance, a streaming data feed of questionable or confirmed malicious URL’s (expressed from recorded junk and phishing e-mail sources) can provide understanding concerning whether attackers have targeted the customers of an organization or its brands. But because e-mail delivery is asynchronous, a real time feed will not always translate on the risk to present window of visibility. By including pDNS into the processing of the type of risk feed, it’s likely to identify both the present and past states of the malicious URL’s and to clump together preceding campaigns by the attackers — thus enabling an organization to prioritize attempts on present risks and optimize results.
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